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The media report news that in turn influences behaviors. This news is drawn from a
set of available information. In this paper, we study how the set of information is “ex
ante” affected by anticipated media coverages. First, we take an exogenous but anticipated
shock of media coverage: Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups. Then, we estimate the
effect of this media coverage shock on the production of reports by a publicity-seeking
actor: NGOs. We use a unique database that collects NGO reports on a sample of 572
firms in 140 countries between 2002 and 2010. Those reports deal with firm practices, and
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the firm. We find that these media coverage shocks significantly impact the production of
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1 Introduction
Mass media play a crucial role in shaping the behavior of agents. Indeed, the information re-
layed by media is known to influence the creation of beliefs (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004), cog-
nitive abilities (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008), voting behaviors (Gentzkow, 2006; Gentzkow
et al., 2011; Snyder and Strömberg, 2010) or even the governmental relief to a natural disaster
(Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007). While these ex post effects on the mass media audience has
been well documented in the literature, little conclusive work has been produced on the effect
of the anticipated media coverage on the behavior of publicity-seeking actors (ex ante effects).
Because such agents try to maximize their probability to be relayed in the media, they are likely
to adapt their behavior. Among these agents, terrorists are usually considered as an example of
actors for which the mass media relay is an indispensable tool. Similarly, political parties are
also known to adapt their decisions to the mass media agenda. Furthermore, Strömberg (2004a)
theoretically shows that the mass media coverage should drive policy decisions taken by those
parties. Publicity-seeking actors may also be agents that themselves disclose information, and
need to be relayed in the media. It is the case of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs),
which, among other roles, audit firms and inform the public opinion on their practices.
The purpose of this analysis is to study the effect of the media coverage on the ex ante produc-
tion of information by NGOs that, in turn, have to be relayed by the media. Our contribution
is then to empirically measure and quantify the mass media effect on the production of infor-
mation by a publicity-seeking actor. In other words, we focus on NGO contribution to the set
of information that is available for journalists. More precisely, we study NGO disclosure of
information on firm practices in terms of environmental, social or societal issues. In order to
measure the media effect on the production of information by NGOs, we use exogenous and
anticipated shocks of media coverage: Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups. Obviously, the
media coverage of sport is influenced by reader attention for these news. Moreover, reader de-
mand effects on media coverage strategies have been emphasized theoretically and empirically
by respectively Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010). In this
paper we do not distinguish between demand and supply effects on the media coverage output.
The shocks we use in this paper, Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups are known to sub-
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stantially affect the media coverage. First of all, Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) shows that
sport news dramatically increases during Olympic Games. As a consequence, other topics are
crowded out. Stylized facts presented in this paper emphasize that the media coverage of these
sport mega-events has an impact on the newsworthiness of at least two players: host and partic-
ipant countries1 on one hand, and sponsor firms on the other hand. So we estimate the effect of
media coverage shocks generated by sport mega events on the production of information con-
cerning (i) firms located in host and participant countries versus firms in other countries, and
(ii) sponsor firms versus other firms.
We observe a heterogeneity in the correlation of the newsworthiness between sport and
host/participant countries on one hand, and sport and sponsor firms on the other hand. In fact,
we document that, stories about sustainable development and environment in host/participant
countries are less covered in the media during a sport mega-event. This pattern suggests that
news about firm practices in host/participant countries are substitutes of sport news. Conversely,
we know that sponsorship investments of firms generate a direct big shock in terms of image
for them. Moreover, we document that the number of news related with firms in general during
sport events decreases, but far less concerning sponsors. So we conclude that the newswor-
thiness between sport and sponsors is complementary. All in all, these stylized facts allow to
distinguish between stories that are expected to be complements (news related to sponsors) and
substitutes (news related to firms in host and participant countries) to sport news.
Then, we estimate the impact of these sport mega-events on the report activity of NGOs.
First of all, we find that the worldwide number of NGO reports is not impacted by the occurrence
of Olympic Games or World Cups. But going further, we show that (i) the number of NGO
reports concerning substitute stories is significantly negatively influenced by sport mega-events,
while (ii) NGO reports on complement stories dramatically increase. Thanks to these results,
we argue that NGOs anticipate the high media coverage of sponsors and decide to disclose
more information on them. Similarly, less newsworthy topics are also less reported by NGOs.
It provides empirical evidence that the ex ante set of information is influenced by an anticipated
and repeated large shock of media coverage.
Furthermore, we separately estimate the effect of the media coverage shock on the number
1Rose and Spiegel (2011) and Bayar and Schaur (2013) show that Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups
generate a boom in the visibility of host and participant countries.
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of reports that are good and bad for firm reputation. We show that the number of good reports
on firms located in host and participant countries is negatively and significantly impacted by the
occurrence of Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups. Conversely, we find no significant impact
on the production of bad reports. It means that the global negative effect on the number of re-
ports on firms located in host and participant countries is driven by a decrease in the number of
good reports. This asymmetric effect on the disclosure of good versus bad information is in line
with the findings of Soroka (2006) that state that the news coverage is biased toward bad news
and that, in turn, the public opinion also responds more to these bad news than to good ones.
Then, our result suggests that, when the news space is constrained, the production of good news
is far more affected than the production of bad news. We run the same exercise in the case of
sponsor firms. We show that both good and bad reports are positively and significantly impacted
by the media coverage shock, but that bad reports overreact compared to good ones. All in all,
both country-quarter level and firm-quarter level analysis suggests that the share of bad NGO
reports increases due to the media coverage shock.
NGOs are a big provider of information that is external to the media, which allows to capture
their publications apart from the media relay. So here, we use the publication of their reports
on their websites. Working with NGOs also has the advantage of avoiding to deal with media
capture. Indeed, Besley and Prat (2006) theoretically emphasize the bias generated by the media
capture of governments. This capture may exist because governments standardly own some of
the media, or because they can change the regulation in favor or against the media industry. But
they also derive a capturing power from the selective access they can offer to famous politicians.
However, there is no reason to believe that NGOs (at least currently) enjoy the same opportunity
to capture the media.
In this paper, we focus on NGO reports on firm practices in terms of social, environmental
or societal issues. Data are provided by Covalence EthicalQuote, which records the publication
of reports on NGO websites. Those reports concern 572 of the largest multinationals firms (in
market capitalization terms) between 2002 and 2010. Particularly, we have information on the
date, the firm targeted by the report, the country of occurrence of the event, and the tone of
the speech. This dataset allows to precisely measure the number of reports published on NGO
websites each quarter between 2002 and 2010. In other words, for each observation, we know
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which firm is targeted, in which country, when it occurred, and whether it is good or bad for
the reputation of the firm. So the content analysis of those reports is particularly convenient to
identify the target behavior of NGOs.
Studying NGO reports is particularly convenient because they are a producer of informa-
tion that is also a publicity-seeker. Indeed, NGOs are standardly defined as a hard information
provider in the literature. In other words, they provide information that is verifiable and highly
trustable, in opposition to soft information. In fact, one of the main issues related to firm prac-
tices is the huge asymmetry of information they generate. Indeed, while firms are considered to
be aware of their practices, stakeholders hardly have access to precise and trustable information
on it. In this context, NGOs are considered as a third party, working on the reduction of this in-
formation asymmetry. The media coverage of their reports is known to have an impact on their
target choices through a change in both the probability of success of their action (e.g. the stan-
dard enforcement) and the donations and membership received by these organizations (see for
instance Aldashev et al. (2013)). However, at the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical
investigation showing that this media coverage drives NGO behaviors in terms of information
disclosure. Arguably, we also contribute to the literature on NGO disclosure strategies, empir-
ically showing that anticipated shocks of media coverage matter in the decisions of NGOs to
relay information. Our result suggests that those organizations are rational agents which adapt
their report strategies to the mass media agenda.
The impact of mass media coverage strategies on the ex ante provision of information by an
external agent2 is theoretically explored by Strömberg (2004a). The author shows that, because
of the increasing return to scale structure of the media industry, the quantity of news relayed
on a given story depends on the size of the group that is interested in reading news about it.
Similarly, the information provided by a publicity-seeking agent, is biased toward stories that
are read by large groups. Our results are in line with this theoretical prediction. Indeed, when
a big shock of attention occurs, NGOs disclose more (less) information on stories of relatively
high (low) interest for readers during this shock. Furthermore, we also use data on the public
interest for sport among countries, and show that the decrease in the number of NGO reports
about participant countries is driven by the interest of those countries for sport. More precisely,
the number of NGO reports decrease in participant countries with a high interest for sport dur-
2An external agent is here defined as an agent that is external to the media.
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ing the event.
The paper is structured as follows. The second part of this paper gives some insight on the media
coverage during sport mega events. In the third part, we present the dataset and the empirical
strategy. In the fourth part, we present and discuss the results concerning the global number
of NGO reports. The fifth section distinguishes the effect of the media coverage shock on the
disclosure of information between stories that are classified as good news or as bad news. The
last part of the paper concludes.
2 Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups: a media coverage
shock
Generally speaking, “mega-events” such as Olympic Games or FIFA World Cups are world
events which bring together the highest audience. Since a decade, this audience goes stronger
and stronger thanks to the development of communication technologies as internet. The 2008
Beijing Olympic Games attracted one of the largest global TV audience ever with 4.7 billion
viewers between August 8 and August 24. Furthermore, Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) clearly
identify that Olympic Games generate a boom in the “Olympic” related articles. But this focus
on the games is also associated to a particular focus on two groups of key players during sport-
mega events: host or participant countries, and sponsor firms. We dedicate this section to
document the media coverage of these actors between 2002 and 2010 (see Appendix B for
more details).
Using a content analysis of newspapers in Factiva, we analyze the trend of the number of
newspaper articles dealing with host/participant countries the months around a sport event for
which they host or participate to this game. We observe a clear pattern: a boom of around 43
% (24 %) in the number of newspaper articles associated with the names of host (participant)
countries during the month of the games, comparing to their media coverage six months before
(see Figures 1 and 2). However, the average number of articles dealing with host (participant)
countries and sustainable development and environment decreases of around 28 % (5%) during
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the event (see Figures 3 and 4), compared to its level six months before. All together, we show
that the focus on Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups is paired with an increase in the media
coverage of host/participant countries, and a decrease in the news coverage of those countries
concerning topics related to firm practices. It gives arguments in favor of a substitutability
between sport news and news related to firm practices in host and participant countries.
We replicate this content analysis in Factiva collecting the number of newspapers including
the name of the 572 firms of our sample. We observe that the number of articles concerning
firms that are not sponsors decreases by more than 30% the month of the event, relatively to
what is observed four months before (see Figure 5). However, the fall in the number of articles
dealing with sponsors is only about 20% during this period, compared to its level four months
before. In other words, we show that while the global media coverage on firms sharply falls, the
decrease in the news articles about sponsors is lower and their relative relay is larger. It means
that stories about practices of sponsors are complement to sport news.
3 Data and Empirical Specification
3.1 Data on NGO reports
We use reports on firm practices to analyze the change in NGO activity of information disclosure
thanks to the Covalence EthicalQuote database. This dataset provides quarterly information
on NGO reports about 572 multinational firms between 2002 and 2010. These firms are the
largest in terms of market capitalization in sectorial Dow Jones indexes. Thus, we calculate the
number of reports made by NGOs every quarter on each of these 572 firms in every country of
the world. We focus on 140 countries for which we observe at least one report during the period
(the reported country is the country of occurrence of the event). Covalence EthicalQuote gives
information about the tone of the speech, classified as ”good” or ”bad” for the environmental,
social or societal reputation of the firm. For instance, if a NGO publish a report on its website to
emphasize that workers in Columbia end up with a hunger strike to claim about their working
conditions in the Coca-Cola Company in March 2004, it is reported in our database as a “bad”
NGO report in the first quarter of year 2004 concerning Coca-Cola in Columbia.
The database covers 5,596 NGO reports published by 1,045 NGOs on their websites con-
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cerning 572 firms and 140 countries. Note that, by definition, following country-specific styl-
ized facts depend on reports published on firms that are located in those countries, and not on
domestic firms. Table 1 presents the share of reports in each region (OECD versus the Rest
of the World) and in the ten largest countries in terms of NGO reports. The USA is the coun-
try where we observe the most reports, and the Czech republic or Slovakia are at the bottom.
69.25% of the total number of reports are bad for firm reputation, but this figure is an umbrella
that conceals a huge heterogeneity. OECD countries attract 40.26% of the reports during 2002
and 2010. The share of good reports is higher in this group of countries (40.25%) than in the
rest of the world (23.21%). The UK has the best average firm practice reputation (good reports
represent 50.54% of the total number of reports in this country) in the sample of the ten largest
countries in report volume. But other countries have an even better average index of reputation,
as Netherlands (90%) or Japan (67.06%). At the bottom, Niger, Saudi Arabia and Cuba have
no reports that are classified as good for firm reputation. In this short list of largest countries in
news volume, Nigeria is the worst with a score of 8.51% of good reports.
3.2 Estimation Framework
In this paper, we focus on both country-specific and firm-specific patterns. It means that we
aggregate our data at (i) the country-quarter level and at (ii) the firm-quarter level.3
Country-Quarter Analysis
The first part of our empirical strategy aims at estimating whether the media coverage during a
big event leads to a change in NGO report activity in host and participant countries. We estimate
the following reduced-form:
ln(Reportsit) = γ0 + γ1Sportit +Ctrl+ αi + it, (1)
where the dependent variable ln(Reportsit) measures the log of the total number of NGO
reports for country i and quarter t. The dummy variable Sportit is alternatively Hostit and
3For the first aggregation, it means that we collapse firm and NGO dimensions. The unit of observation becomes
country-quarter. For the second aggregation, we collapse country and NGO dimensions. The unit of observation
here is firm-quarter.
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Participationit.4 Hostit = 1 (Hostit = 0) indicates that country i hosts (does not host) a sport
mega event at quarter t, and Participationit = 1 (Participationit = 0) that country i partici-
pates (does not participate) to a sport mega event during quarter t. We first include country fixed
effects, αi, in order to control for time-invariant country-specific characteristics and to control
for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. We also include alternatively other regressors
(Ctrl) to reduce the omitted variables bias that can drive our result. More precisely, we first
run a difference-and-difference model with the inclusion of quarter fixed effects that control
for time-specific shocks common to all countries. Second, we add alternatively to quarter fixed
effects season fixed effects to control for the seasonality that is observed in our data. It absorbs
seasonal worldwide changes.
But the inclusion of time (quarter or season) fixed effects do not absorb heterogeneity aris-
ing from trends in the evolution of country characteristics or NGO activism. We argue that eco-
nomic development process, the increase in education level, the improvement in institutional
quality or the democratization process matter to estimate a causal link between the coverage
strategies of media and NGO activities. We include alternatively country-specific time (quarter
or season) trends to control for heterogeneity arising from trends (which are not captured by
time fixed effects). In our main specification, we do not add other control variables to the model
in order to avoid the “bad control” problem (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).5 We then estimate the
effect of the media coverage of hosting or participating to a sport mega event on the number of
NGO reports in this country using an ordinary least square estimator. All specifications present
robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level.
4A continuous variable of media coverage could have been picked up instead of a dummy variable for host and
participating countries. There are three main reasons for us to build up our identification strategy on a dummy
variable. First, an exhaustive information on the number of articles of newspaper related to the events and to host
and participant countries would be necessary. It means that we would have to create an exhaustive list of country-
specific keywords (in different languages) in order to cover all sports, players or teams. The building of this list
would be highly arbitrary and questionable. Second, we claim that the behavior of NGOs is mainly driven by the
anticipation of big events. By construction (and definition), the country-specific continuous variable is impacted
by the (unanticipated) performance of its teams and players. As a consequence, it doesn’t allow to distinguish
between the effect of anticipated and unanticipated media coverage shocks. Third, a continuous variable would be
suspected to be endogenous (reverse causality issue). Indeed, the construction of this measure would capture the
media coverage of NGO reports.
5See section 3.2.3. Many variables that we may want to add are themselves outcome variables of mega-sport
events. We know that mega-sport events drive government behavior (Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007) or national
imports (Rose and Spiegel, 2011), exports (Bayar and Schaur, 2013) or economic development, for instance. The
estimated coefficient of Sportit will capture the effect of Sportit on NGO reports for a given level of trade or
GDP level, for instance. It makes it difficult to interpret our result as a causal link.
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The coefficient γ1 is associated to the effect of Sportit on NGO reports. If γ1 = 0 (non
significant effect), it means that these media coverage shocks have no impact on the report
activity of NGOs. On the contrary, if γ1 is significantly different from 0, it provides empirical
evidence that the ex ante set of information is influenced by an anticipated and repeated large
shock of media coverage. More precisely, if γ1 < 0 (and significant), it supports the idea that
substitute stories to sport news are also less reported by NGOs during the media coverage shock.
Otherwise, if γ1 > 0 (and significant), it means that substitute stories to sport news are more
reported by NGOs. This result would be highly surprising regarding media coverage patterns
presented in section 2, and would suggest that NGOs are not rational.
We go further also in estimating separately the effect of Sportit on i) NGO reports that are
“good” for firms reputation, and ii) NGO reports that are classified as “bad”. We estimate the
two following equations
ln(GoodReportsit) = δ0 + δ1Sportit +Ctrl+ αi + ωit, (2)
ln(BadReportsit) = λ0 + λ1Sportit +Ctrl+ αi + υit, (3)
where ln(GoodReportsit) (ln(BadReportsit)) measures the log of the total number of
good (bad) NGO reports. We include the same set of control variables than in equation (1).
This analysis allows to differentiate the global result in the first empirical part. Such a work is
motivated by the literature emphasizing asymmetric responses of both the media and the public
opinion to good versus bad news. The main finding of the literature is that bad news are more
relayed in the media and affect more the public opinion than good ones (Sokora, 2006). If
NGOs internalize this pattern in their strategies, we expect them to give priority to bad reports.
In such a case, NGO bad reports should over-react comparing to good ones (λ1 > δ1 > 0 or
0 > λ1 > δ1). We present and discuss in more details our interpretation of the results in the
light of this literature in the following section.
Firm-Quarter Analysis
The second set of estimations captures the effect of the media coverage shock on the NGO report
activity on firms which are sponsor of a sport mega-event. In other words, we study whether
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the sponsorship activity during a sport media coverage shock could influence the firm-specific
information disclosure of NGOs. We now aggregate our initial dataset at the firm-quarter level6
and we estimate the following equation:
ln(Reportsjt) = β0 + β1Sponsorjt +Ctrl+ θj + ηjt (4)
ln(Reportsjt) is the log of the total number of NGO reports at quarter t concerning firm j in
any country of our sample of 140 countries. Sponsorjt captures the effect of “being a sponsor
of a sport mega-event”. Sponsorjt = 1 (Sponsorjt = 0) indicates that firm j is (is not) the
sponsor of a sport mega event at quarter t. We add regressors that are sector specific or time
specific (Ctrl). We include sector fixed effects to control for time-invariant sector-specific char-
acteristics. It absorbs sectorial specificities, as the fact that activities linked to natural resources
extraction are more targeted by NGOs than activities of information and communication. We
also use time specific variables such as quarter fixed effects, common time trend to capture time
heterogeneity arising from time trend or common shock. Finally, we introduce sector-specific
time trends to absorb heterogeneity arising from sector trend differences.
Our interpretation of the results is very close to the one of the country specific estimation: a
(non) significant result would mean that the disclosure activity of NGOs is (not) impacted by a
change in the media exposure shock. A positive (negative) result would suggest that stories that
are complement to sport news are more (less) disclosed when the media coverage of sport news
is very large. We also distinguish between good and bad reports in the following estimations:
ln(GoodReportsjt) = χ0 + χ1Sponsorjt +Ctrl+ θj + ξjt (5)
ln(BadReportsjt) = η0 + η1Sponsorjt +Ctrl+ θj + ζjt (6)
Once again, the literature on the asymmetry between good and bad news suggests that we
should observe a differentiated effect on good and bad information disclosure. So we compare
χ1 and η1 and test whether they are significantly different or not.
6In this exercise we do not focus anymore on a country analysis.
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3.3 Stylized facts for country-quarter pairs and firm-quarter pairs
In the first part, our main explanatory variable is the hosting of World Cups and Olympic Games,
during the period 2002-2010. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Federation
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) are in charge of the attribution of Olympic Games
and World Cup, respectively. We cover 9 events: two Summer Olympic Games (Greece 2004
and China 2008), three Winter Olympic Games (USA 2002, Italy 2006 and Canada 2010) and
three World Cups (Korea and Japan 2002, Germany 2006 and South Africa 2010). Table ST1
sum up the list of host countries between 2002 and 2010. Then, we also use a second set of
explanatory variables: the participation to a World Cup. 32 countries participate to World Cups
and the country list for each event is presented in Table ST2. The number of NGO reports by
country-quarter pair (see Table 2) is very heterogeneous, with a mean of 4.36 and a standard de-
viation of 7.1, and a median number of reports of 2. The maximum number of country-quarter
specific NGO reports is 80 and it is observed in the USA at the second semester of 2005. As
we already mentioned, most of the reports are bad for firm reputation, and this pattern is also
reflected in the number of country-quarter good and negative reports. More precisely, the aver-
age number of good and bad reports are respectively of 1.34 and 3.02 with a standard deviation
of 3.01 and 5.1.
The second set of estimations mainly uses a sponsorship dummy variable at the firm-quarter
level. The list of firms in our sample that are sponsors is detailed in Table ST3. For each
sport event, we find between 7 and 12 firms in our database that are sponsors. The number of
NGO reports by firm-quarter pair is also very heterogeneous: the mean number is 0.22, with
a standard deviation of 0.80. The maximum number of reports (17) is recorded for two firms,
Chevron and Exxon Mobil at the second semester of 2005. The number of bad reports by
firm-quarter pair is also larger (mean: 0.15, standard deviation: 0.66) than the number of good
reports (mean: 0.07, standard deviation: 0.31). All of these firm-quarter specific stylized facts
are sum up by Table 3 .
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4 Effect of media coverage shocks on NGO reports
4.1 Impact on host countries
Main Results
We have documented in section 2 that stories about host countries are substitute to sport news.
So we estimate whether the anticipated low media coverage of host country related stories af-
fects the information disclosure of NGOs concerning those countries. As we already mentioned,
we use NGO reports on firm practices and in this subsection, we focus on country-specific re-
ports, defined as reports targeting firms located in a given country. In other words, we first
estimate the change in the number of NGO reports published on firms located in host countries
that is explained by the fact that the country is hosting a sport event (equation 1).
We now present our main results in Table 4. In the first column, we run a difference-in-
difference model with the inclusion of country and quarter fixed effects. By including country
fixed effects, the empirical model exploits the within-country impact of hosting a mega sport-
event overtime and controls for time invariant country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. The
quarter fixed effects control for time-specific shocks common to all countries. The effect of
hosting a big event on the level of NGO reports is significantly negative. In other words, it
provides empirical evidence that the ex ante set of information is influenced by an anticipated
and repeated large shock of media coverage. As shown by Eisensee and Strömberg (2007),
there is also seasonal variation in news competition. In column (2), we control for that by
including season fixed effects instead of quarter fixed effects. In column (3), we consider that
the seasonal variation in news competition could be country-specific. The inclusion of country-
specific season fixed effects do not affect our results. As underlined previously, the inclusion
of time (quarter or season) fixed effects control partially for heterogeneity arising from trends
in the evolution of country characteristics or NGO activism. In column (4), we add a common
time trend to control for economic development or democratization process that can trigger
both the coverage strategies of media and NGO activities for instance. Our results are broadly
unchanged to the inclusion of country-specific time trends (columns 5), which control for the
heterogeneity arising from country-specific trends. So we argue that hosting a big event reduces
the number of NGO reports concerning firms located in the country, during the quarter of the
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event. It means that media coverage shocks generated on host countries related stories during a
sport mega event reduce by 44% the number of NGO reports. In other words, our result suggests
that stories that are substitute of sport news are also less reported by NGOs.
Robustness Checks
Nevertheless, we present the estimation of equation 1 but including country-specific control
variables in Table ST4 in Appendix. Of course, we note that these variables may be influenced
by the anticipation of the game, and then they might biased all estimated coefficients (Angrist
and Pischke, 2009). We choose to include the log of the GDP per Capita, that is by definition
correlated with the economic activity and may positively influence NGO reports (size effect).
But it is also positively correlated with the level of norms implemented in countries. Given the
fact that 69.25% of the reports in our database are bad for firm reputation, we have no clear
expectation on the sign of the coefficient of GDP per Capita. Similarly, we include the log of
the population that captures the effect of the country size and a Trade Openness index. We
finally add a measure of democracy (Polity 2) and a global index of institution quality (ICRG).
We find no significant effect of these variables, but of institution quality. Indeed, we observe
that better institutions affect positively and significantly the number of NGO reports on firm
practices. However, when we observe in more details the effect of institutions related to the
freedom of media, we do not find any evidence that they affect NGO reports, except for Civil
Liberties.
To test the robustness of the significant negative impact of hosting, we realize four falsifica-
tion exercises. The idea is to test whether our result might be due to luck or to some patterns in
the data that are not explained by the hosting of a mega sport-event.7 Table ST18 in Appendix
sums up the results of this subsection. It also points out that in each case, more than 80% of the
coefficients obtained with false Host dummies are no significantly different from zero (with a
level of significance at 10%). Similarly, the share of negative and significant coefficients ob-
tained in each exercise is between 11.50% (in the full randomization case) and 5.20% (in the
shift exercise). So we argue that our result is not due to luck or to some pattern in the data.
7We run 1,000 regressions drawing randomly the variable Sportit, using a uniform probability of draw. We
then create a dummy variable equal to one when the pair has been chosen, and zero otherwise. We use this
new dummy instead of the true “sport game host” variable. We run our benchmark regression (with country and
country-specific quarter trends) with this new Host variable.
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We observe that the number of observations broadly varies across countries. As a conse-
quence, we run a weighted regression where the weight denotes the inverse of the probability
that the observation is included because of the sampling design. We find that our results hold.
Our results are broadly robust to the use of a Tobit terminology defined with a left censure at
zero instead of an OLS.8 Results are unchanged if we aggregate the original data at the country-
year level instead of the country-quarter level. This result means that the year of the game there
is no significant reallocation of NGO efforts on quarters that are before or after the occurrence
of the game. Furthermore, we include lag and forecast variables in our country-quarter main
specification and find that our result holds (Table ST6). We also find that the quarter following
the event is also negatively and significantly impacted by the media coverage shock of the sport
event. We now test the robustness of our result to the exclusion of the most influential observa-
tions (country-quarter pair in our case). We identify two and three standard deviation outliers
and therefore drop them from our main specification. Results are unchanged and are presented
in Table ST5 in the Appendix.
All these exercises show that the fall in NGO reports in host countries during the quarter
of the event is robust, and particularly to the inclusion of omitted variables or to the “luck”
hypothesis. If our result is explained by an anticipation by NGOs of the weak relay of host
country related stories in the media, we should observe a similar result estimating equation (1)
with the country-specific participation to the sport event as the main explanatory variable. We
explore the effect of the media coverage shock linked to the participation to a sport mega-event
on the number of NGO reports in the following subsection.9
8Results are not shown here but are available upon request.
9We consider also the effect of the candidature to a big events or the choice of the country for the organization.
In both cases, the effect is not significant on NGO reports (Table ST16 in Appendix). During the candidature or
the choice, the media coverage is substantially lower than for the big event organization. These results confirm that
NGO behavior is driven by large media coverage. We test also if the political election in a country can have the
same effect as sport mega event (column 2, Table ST17 in Appendix). The effect is not significant. The literature
highlights the link between the policy life cycle and NGOs activities life cycle. The authors points out that NGOs
have some incentive to spread information before elections to increase their impact on the society. Therefore, we
do not enter in more details with this type of shock. For comparison with other (unexpected) shocks proposed
by the literature, we focus also on the effect on natural disasters effect on NGO behavior. The effects are not




Given the significant negative effect of the media coverage shock on reports on host countries,
we expect a similar negative impact on reports on participant countries. Indeed, it should be
more difficult to have a hearing when reporting on firms located in countries for which the na-
tional team is playing during a sport event. Unfortunately this intuition can only be tested for
countries that participate to World Cups because almost all countries are participant to Olympic
Games. We show that the participation to a World Cup reduces the number of NGO reports on
firm practices in countries that are engaged in such events (column 1 in Table 5, which includes
country fixed effects and country-specific time trends). The negative effect on participant coun-
tries is lower than the effect observed on host countries with a coefficient of−0.127 and−0.444
respectively.10 The media coverage shock generated for a participant country reduces by 13%
the number of NGO reports the quarter of the event.
Similarly, we now estimate an unanticipated shock of media coverage, that comes from
the performance of the national team during the World Cup: the effect of playing an eighth-
final, a quarter-final, a semi-final or the final. Indeed, while host countries and participants
are known before the beginning of the game, at least some uncertainty remains for national
teams concerning their qualification in finals. The intuition is that a good performance during a
FIFA World Cup may provide less incentives to report on firm practices in the country because
those news are substitute to sport news. We also find that the better the performance of a
country in finals, the larger the negative effect on NGO reports on firms located in this country.
This is explained by the fact that the media coverage of team and players is higher when the
country is far away in the competition. Table 5 shows that the eighth-final participation of
World Cup reduces the number of NGO reports by 24% (column 2). The effect is larger than
in the participation case (in Table 5 column 1). This is also the case for countries qualified
to the quarter-finals, the semi-finals and the final (Table 5 column 2 to 4). Coefficients are
increasing and significantly different from column to column. These results confirm that the
media coverage of sport events has a negative impact on the number of information disclosures
on firm practices in countries that are engaged in such events.11
10Coefficient differences are significantly different from zero.
11We consider also the participation to another sport event with Rugby World Cups (see column 1, Table ST17
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Robustness Checks
The effects of the participation and the performance during a FIFA World Cup are robust to the
inclusion of quarters fixed effects, season and season-country specific fixed effects and common
quarter time trends (Table ST7 in Appendix). These results are also robust in the case of annual
data or Tobit methodology (Results not shown here). They also still hold when we include lag
and forecast of the participation dummies, and we also find that NGOs report less the quarter
following the sport event. We include country-specific characteristics as the GDP per Capita,
population, openness to trade, an index of democracy and of institution quality. Table ST8
shows that our results still holds when we include those variables. The same conclusion appears
when we include measures of freedom of press and freedom of speech (Table ST9). Again,
one can argue that our results on the participation is driven by some influential observations
(country-quarter pair in our case). In other words, the results may be very sensitive to the
inclusion/exclusion of a small number of observations. We identify two and three standard
deviation outliers and therefore we drop them in our main specification. Results are unchanged
(Table ST10 in Appendix).
Further Analysis
We argue that the number of NGO reports in participant countries is negatively influenced by the
participation of the national team to a FIFA World Cup. The intuition is that NGOs anticipate
that the media coverage of reports on firm practices is negatively affected by the large sport
media coverage, because stories about participant countries (except for sport related stories)
are substitute to sport stories. If this explanatory channel is verified, we should observe a
similar negative effect of the interest for soccer on the number of NGO reports in participant
countries. Indeed, during a World Cup, the media coverage of soccer should be larger the
higher the interest of the public opinion for soccer news. The impact of the interest for soccer
on NGO reports is presented in Table ST12. We choose five proxies of the country-specific
public interest for soccer. In column (1), we interact the number of World Cups won in the past
(since the creation of the World Cup) with the participation dummy.12 We find that the effect of
in Appendix). The effect is negative as expected even if Rugby cannot be considered as a worldwide sport and
whether the popular movement is weaker than for FIFA World Cups or Olympic Games.
12Country fixed effects absorb the variable of the number of World Cups won. In our sample, France and United
Kingdom won once the World Cup, Argentina and Uruguay won twice the World Cup, Germany won three time
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the participation becomes insignificant, while the interaction term between the participation and
the number of World Cups won is negative and significant. Then, in column (2) we introduce
the number of soccer clubs in each country divided by the population of the country, interacted
with the participation to a World Cup. The limit of this variable is due to the fact that the mean
number of clubs per capita is 0.14 with a standard deviation of 0.019. So the variability of this
measure is very weak. We find no significant result with this proxy, and the negative impact of
the participation variable still holds. In column (3) to (5), we introduce more direct measure of
the public interest for sport or soccer. Indeed, we use the score to questions about sport in the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Leisure Time and Sports module. This survey
covers only 34 countries in 2007, so we loose a large share of our sample when we include these
variables.13 The first question of this survey we use is “What sport do you watch on TV most
frequently?”, and we measure the proportion of people in each country that answer “soccer”.
Then, we use the share of people in a country that believe that there is too much sport on TV. And
finally, we measure the share of people that are proud of their country when their national team
win a sport competition. We find evidence that these measures negatively influence the reports
of NGO during sport mega-events. However, this result is not always significant. All in all,
NGOs report less in countries with a strong culture of sport and more precisely football/soccer.
NGOs anticipate that stories that are substitute to sport news will be less reported by media
when the media coverage of sport is very large. This effect is higher in country with a strong
culture of sport. Results are broadly unchanged if we consider the performance of a country
during a FIFA World Cup instead of the participation (see column 6 to 10 for eight finals).
4.3 Sponsor effect
Main Results
Previous results underline that hosting and participating to a sport event reduces the number
of NGO reports concerning firms located in such countries, during the quarter of the event. In
other words, our result shows that stories that are substitute to sport news are less reported by
the World Cup, Italy four times the World Cup and Brazil won five times the World Cup.
13This survey is just available for one year but we consider that answers are constant over time in our sample.
In other words, we attribute to each country, the value of 2007 for all years of our sample. Country fixed effects
absorb the variable of ISSP which are constant over time.
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NGOs. It also suggests that we should observe a positive effect on reports about stories that
are complementary to sport news. We now focus on the effect of the media coverage shock
generated by the sponsorship activity of the firm during a sport event on the number of NGO
reports. As a consequence, the unit of observation is now the firm-quarter level.
Table 6 presents our results of the estimation of equation 4. We first control for the cross
sectoral differences in the NGO reports14 and for common quarter shocks with the inclusion of
sector and quarter fixed effects, respectively. The number of NGO reports increases by 21% for
sponsors of a sport events in comparison to firms that are not sponsor. It suggests that stories
that are complementary to sport are more disclosed when sport is more covered by the media.
Thanks to these results, we argue that NGOs anticipate the change in the media coverage of
sponsors during the event and decide to disclose more information on them. In other words, it
provides empirical evidence that the ex ante set of information is influenced by an anticipated
and repeated large shock of media coverage. Our result is robust to many different specification.
We first consider that the evolution of sector characteristics may move over time and influence
NGO activism (such as a progressive adoption of technology that are more respectful of the
environment). We include sector-specific time trends with sector fixed effects in column (2).
We add also sector fixed effects, quarter fixed effects and sector-specific time trends (column
3). Results are unchanged. We alternatively consider the hypothesis that omitted time-invariant
firm-specific characteristics can drive our results. Then, we include firm fixed effects (columns
4 to 6). By including these firm fixed effects, we exploit the within-firm impact of the media
coverage shock generated by the sponsoring during a the sport event over time. We show that
NGOs decide to disclose more information on sponsors during sport events: the number of NGO
reports increases by around 10% for those firms in comparison to firms that are not sponsor.
Robustness Checks
The positive effect of the sponsorship on the number of NGO reports is robust to the inclusion of
firm characteristics. We use here the logarithm of the annual sales, operating revenue and total
assets of firms.15 These variables allows to control for size effects and may impact the report
activity of NGOs. We find that these firm-specific size proxies have a positive impact on the
14The average number of NGO reports between 2002 and 2010 by firms in the Mining and Quarrying industry
is about 20, while it is around 3 in the Information and Communication or Financial and Insurance sectors.
15Those variables are provided by the Orbis database.
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number of NGO reports in the within sector analysis (Table ST13 in Appendix, columns (1) and
(2)), and a negative but no robust impact in the within firm analysis (Table ST13 in Appendix,
columns (3) and (4)). However, they might also influence and be influenced by the sponsorship
activity of the firm, which might biased all estimated coefficients (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
As in the country-quarter analysis, our results may be driven by some influential observations
(firm-quarter pairs in our case). We again identify two and three standard deviation outliers
and therefore we drop them in our main specification: results are unchanged (Table ST14 in
Appendix). Finally, we add lag and forecast of the sponsorship dummy variable to our main
specification, with sector fixed effects, quarter fixed effects and sector-specific time trends. We
find that the positive and significant effect of the sponsorship media coverage effect holds, and
that NGO also report more the quarter before the event (Table ST15 in Appendix).
4.4 Discussion
We conclude this section by arguing that the production of information about complements and
substitutes to sport news is significantly influenced by the sport media coverage shock. The
only potential mechanism that drives this result is the anticipation by NGOs that complements
(substitutes) have a higher (lower) probability to be relayed in the media during sport events.
This mechanism may be explained by the increasing return to scale of the media industry em-
phasized by Strömberg (2004b). Indeed, in such a framework, highly newsworthy stories, as
sport news, are highly covered by the media; and other stories have a lower probability to be
relayed.
But the limited attention mechanism also provides a good explanation to this phenomenon.
Indeed, works in psychological research highlight that there is a limit in human capacity to
attend different issues. Weber (2006) defines human being as ”an information processor with
finite attention and memoir”. Furthermore, this finite attention on information is also relevant
in terms of the number of problems that can be addressed. It is summed up in the concept of
a ”finite pool of worry” (Marx et al. (2007), Weber (2006)). Similar patterns are observed in
the content of newspapers, TV and radio broadcasts. In other words, the human finite attention
is clearly observable in the media, that also provide a finite information space. Djerf-Pierre
(2012) explains that ”news attention is a zero-sum game” in the sense that a boom in the news
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on a given topic is allowed by a decrease in other news attention. This phenomenon generate
then a competition among issues. Using Swedish television news reporting over 30 years, she
provides empirical evidence that environmental news are crowed out by news about economics
or conflicts. In the economics literature, George and Waldfogel (2006) find empirical evidence
of issue competition between local and national/international news. They argue that growth of
national media (e.g. The New York Times) cause substitution away from local news sources.
They find that in area where the New York Times expanded, readership of local newspapers
fell among educated readers. Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) sheds light on issue competition
in the US news broadcasts. They study the relief of the US government in case of natural
disaster abroad, as a function of the news volume about these events in the US. They find that
some particular news i) create a crowding out effect for news related to natural disaster, and
then ii) decrease US governmental reliefs. In other words, they show that the relief of the US
government will be smaller in times characterized by a surge in attention for other news (that
are unrelated to the disaster). In particular, they find that Olympic Games are the best example
of events generating crowding out effects on other news, and in particular on natural disaster
news. Both mechanisms (i.e. the cost structure of the media industry and limited attention)
may also be reinforced by social interactions among agents, as developed in Aldashev (2010).
Indeed, agents not only have an incentive to get informed about sport news because they like it,
but also because it increases their utility through the social interactions it generates within their
network, or expanding it.
5 Effect of media coverage shocks on the tone of the speech
The previous section studies the change in one aspect of the set of information: the number of
reports on different targets (host and participant countries, and sponsors). We now address the
potential change in the tone of the speech of these NGO reports, that would be explained by
the media coverage shock. Soroka (2006) investigates asymmetries in the media coverage and
public response to good and bad economic news.16 He uses a text analysis based on The Times
16Similarly, scholars in psychology highlight that responses to good and bad news are standardly asymmetric:
bad news are known to affect more believes than good ones. Works in political science also show that bad news
influence more voting behavior, and US presidents have been more penalized for bad decisions than they were
rewarded for good ones. The mass media literature highlight that violent crime, conflict and crisis are overempha-
sized, and that we observe a larger coverage of bad economic news than good ones. Similarly, in economics agents
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between 1986 and 2000 and finds that i) the media coverage is driven towards bad economic
news and ii) public opinion also responds more to these bad news. Assuming that NGOs inte-
grate that the tone of the speech of their reports also influences their media coverage, it might
impact their propensity to publish good and bad news.
5.1 Host and participation effect
We estimate the impact of the media coverage shock generated on host countries on (i) good
reports and (ii) bad reports. We observe that the change in NGO reports is not the same con-
sidering both types of reports, as presented in Table 7. More precisely, the share of bad NGO
reports on firms located in these countries increases (column 1). Indeed, good NGO reports
are negatively and significantly affected by the media coverage shock (column 2), while bad
reports are not (column 3). In conclusion, the negative effect generated by the media coverage
shock on host countries is driven by a decrease in the news that are classified as “good for firm
reputation”.
Furthermore, the lack of impact on bad NGO reports allows to reject the hypothesis that a
change in the freedom of speech of the host country or in the monitoring of firms (due to the
sport event) explains the decrease in the total NGO reports. Arguably, because sport games
are anticipated by governments and firms, we could have expected to observe a decline in the
access to information in host countries. Similarly, firms might have improve their practices. But
these mechanisms would have negatively affect news that are bad for the reputation of firms.
However, we find that bad news are not significantly impacted and then we do not go further in
this debate.
Similarly, we present in Table 8 the effect of the participation on both positive and negative
reports. We find the same result than in the case of host countries: the number of good reports is
negatively and significantly influenced by the participation, and bad reports are not significantly
impacted.
are standardly assumed to be risk or loss adversed. The Prospect Theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) shed lights on the fact that behaviors are more affected by a potential loss in utility than by a potential gain.
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5.2 Sponsorship effect
We now focus on the potential differentiated effects on good and bad reports concerning spon-
sors. The unit of observation is now the firm-quarter level. Table 9 presents our result. In
columns (1) and (2), we control for sector fixed effects, quarter fixed effects and sector-specific
time trends. The effect of the media coverage of sponsors is positive and significant on both the
number of good (10%) and bad NGO reports (14%). The difference between these two effects
is significantly different from 0. Similarly to our findings in the country-quarter level analysis,
we find that bad reports overreact to the media coverage shock compared to the response of
good reports. However, this result does not hold when we introduce firm fixed effects, quarter
fixed effects and firm-specific trends.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The empirical evidence we present in this paper suggests that publicity-seeking actors adapt
significantly and in a large magnitude their behavior to a media coverage shock. Quantitatively,
the number of country-specific NGO reports, on average, decreases by around forty-four percent
when the country is hosting a sport event. Similarly, the number of NGO reports on participant
countries falls by around thirteen percent during FIFA World Cups. On the contrary, stories
that appear to be more covered during sport events, news about sponsors, are more reported by
NGOs by around twenty-one percent. We argue that the only potential mechanism is that NGOs
are rational agents that anticipate the change in the media relay for such stories. In all of these
three cases, the share of bad reports in the total number of NGO reports increases substantially.
We are then confident that other mechanisms potentially driving NGO reports, i.e. the access
to information and firm practices themselves, cannot drive our result. If the anticipation of
such events by governments and firms both worsens the access to bad information and creates
incentive for firms to adopt better practices, then we even underestimate the media coverage
effect on the production of information by NGOs.
All in all, we find that big media coverage shocks lead to a change in the set of information
that is available for journalists, both in terms of topics and in the tone of the speech. This finding
raises concerns about the effect of the media in the information disclosure process. Indeed, in
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the particular case we study here, NGOs and the media are the only actors that make people
aware of firm practices. This information asymmetry is obviously enhanced in a world where
firms produce, employe people and potentially pollute in countries that are far away from the
location of their consumers. In like-wise situations of information asymmetry, we argue that the
expected media coverage creates deep distortions in the target strategy of information disclosers.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of NGO Reports by Country
Country # of NGO World Share of Share of Negative
Reports NGO Reports NGO Reports
World 5597 1 0.69
OECD 3119 0.56 0.77
ROW 2478 0.44 0.60
USA 1248 0.22 0.61
India 331 0.06 0.80
China 309 0.05 0.74
Indonesia 195 0.03 0.90
South Africa 188 0.03 0.76
Nigeria 188 0.03 0.91
United Kingdom 184 0.03 0.50
Brazil 173 0.03 0.55
Canada 170 0.03 0.57
Mexico 168 0.03 0.74
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for the World, the OECD,
the Rest of the World (ROW) and the 10 countries with the highest level
of NGO reports. Column 1 gives the total number of NGO reports over
the 2002-2010 period, column 2 gives the share of each country on the
total number of NGO reports and column 3 indicates the share of negative
NGO reports. Data come from the CovalenceEthicalQuote database.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of NGO Reports by country-quarter pair
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
# of NGO Reports 4.36 7.1 1 80
# of Negative NGO Reports 3.02 5.1 0 63
# of Positive NGO Reports 1.34 3.01 0 27
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for the number of
total, negative and positive NGO reports. The number of obser-
vations is 1284 for each variable. Data are based on authors’
calculations from the CovalenceEthicalQuote database.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of NGO Reports by firm-quarter pair
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
# of NGO Reports 0.20 0.77 0 17
# of Negative NGO Reports 0.15 0.66 0 16
# of Positive NGO Reports 0.06 0.27 0 5
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for the number of
total, negative and positive NGO reports by firm-quarter pair.
The number of observations is 20412 for each variable. Data
come from the CovalenceEthicalQuote database.
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Table 4: Level of NGO Report and Sport Event Hosting
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Host -0.548** -0.478** -0.476** -0.500** -0.444**
(0.223) (0.191) (0.236) (0.209) (0.185)
Country FE: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE: Yes - - - -
Season FE: - Yes - - -
Country Season FE: - - Yes - -
Common Quarter Trends: - - - Yes -
Country Quarter Trends : - - - - Yes
Observations 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284
R-squared 0.141 0.017 0.173 0.068 0.196
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and
∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. OLS regressions
with quarterly data. Constant is not shown. The dependent variable is the total number
of NGO reports by country-quarter. Host is a dummy equal to 1 if the country hosts a
sport mega event at quarter t. All specifications include country fixed effect. Column
1 includes also quarter fixed effects. Column 2 and 3, we include season fixed effects
and country-specific season fixed effects, respectively. Column 4 includes a common
quarter trends. The last specification includes country-specific time trends.
Table 5: Level of NGO Report and World Cup Participation and Performance
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explanatory Variables
(Performance) Participation 1/8 Final 1/4 Final 1/2 Final F inal V ictory
Performance -0.127* -0.239** -0.500*** -0.722*** -0.748*** -0.754*
(0.0761) (0.115) (0.0905) (0.169) (0.286) (0.435)
Observations 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284
R-squared 0.194 0.195 0.199 0.200 0.197 0.195
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The explanatory variable Sport is alternatively the following
variables: Participation is coded 1 for countries that participated in World Cup and 0 otherwise (column
1); 1/8Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a eight-final of World Cup (column 2); 1/4Final
is coded 1 for countries that participated to a quarter-final of World Cup (column 3); 1/2Final is coded 1
for countries that participated to a semi-final of World Cup (column 4); Finalt is coded 1 for countries that
participated to a final of World Cup (column 5); V ictory is coded 1 for countries that won the final of World
Cup (column 6). OLS regressions for all specifications with country fixed effects and country-specific quarter
trends. Constant is not shown.
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Table 6: Level of NGO reports and Sponsorship Activities of Firms
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sponsor 0.207** 0.213** 0.208** 0.0938** 0.129** 0.0899*
(0.0838) (0.0834) (0.0839) (0.0449) (0.0605) (0.0461)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes - - -
Firm FE - - - Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes - Yes Yes - Yes
Sector-Specific Time Trends - Yes Yes - - -
Firm-Specific Time Trends - - - - Yes Yes
Observations 20,412 20,412 20,412 20,412 20,412 20,412
R-squared 0.045 0.028 0.049 0.386 0.219 0.455
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at firms level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively
denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. OLS regressions. Constant is not shown. The
dependent variable is the total number of NGO reports at quarter t. Sponsor is a dummy equal to
1 if the firm is a sponsor to a sport mega event at quarter t. Column 1 includes sector and quarter
fixed effects. Column 2 includes sector fixed effects and sector-specific time trends. Column
3 includes sector fixed effects, quarter fixed effects and sector-specific time trends. Column 4
includes firm and quarter fixed effects. Column 5 includes firm fixed effects and firm-specific time
trends. Column 6 includes firm fixed effects, quarter fixed effects and firm-specific time trends.
Table 7: Positive and Negative NGO Reports and Sport Event Hosting
Dependent Variable: Share of Negative NGO Positive Negative
Reports Reports Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3)
Host 0.290*** -0.467*** -0.127
(0.0643) (0.0535) (0.224)
Observations 1,284 1,284 1,284
R-squared 0.164 0.107 0.214
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses
with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels. OLS regressions for all specifications. Constant is
not shown. All specifications include country fixed effects and country-
specific time trends. The dependent variable is alternatively the share of
negative NGO reports over the total amount of NGO reports (column 1),
the total number of positive NGO reports (column 2) and the total num-
ber of negative NGO reports (column 3). Host is a dummy equal to 1 if
the country hosts a sport mega event at quarter t.
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Table 8: Positive and Negative NGO Reports and World Cup Participation
Dependent Variable: Share of Negative NGO Positive Negative
Reports Reports Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3)
Participation 0.0905** -0.174** 0.00969
(0.0449) (0.0683) (0.0844)
Dependent Variable: Share of Negative NGO Positive Negative
Reports Reports Reports
Specifications (4) (5) (6)
1/8Final 0.111** -0.181** -0.0703
(0.0452) (0.0853) (0.109)
Dependent Variable: Share of Negative NGO Positive Negative
Reports Reports Reports
Specifications (7) (8) (9)
1/4Final 0.128 -0.350*** -0.313***
(0.0807) (0.0915) (0.110)
Dependent Variable: Share of Negative NGO Positive Negative
Reports Reports Reports
Specifications (10) (11) (12)
1/2Final 0.337*** -0.662*** -0.327*
(0.0305) (0.118) (0.178)
Dependent Variable: Share of Negative NGO Positive Negative
Reports Reports Reports
Specifications (13) (14) (15)
Final 0.404*** -0.757*** -0.358
(0.00785) (0.183) (0.275)
Dependent Variable: Share of Negative NGO Positive Negative
Reports Reports Reports
Specifications (16) (17) (18)
V ictory 0.405*** -0.814*** -0.354
(0.0118) (0.269) (0.418)
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ re-
spectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The number of observation
is 1,268 for each specifications. Participation is coded 1 for countries that participated in
World Cup and 0 otherwise. 1/8Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a eight-
final of World Cup. 1/4Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a quarter-final
of World Cup. 1/2Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a semi-final of World
Cup. Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a final of World Cup. OLS regres-
sions for all specifications with country fixed effects and country specific quarter trends.
Constant is not shown.
30
Table 9: Level of NGO reports and Sponsorship Activities of Firms
Dependent Variable: Positive Negative Positive Negative
Reports Reports Reports Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sponsor 0.102*** 0.139* 0.0501* 0.0654
(0.0333) (0.0741) (0.0263) (0.0500)
Sector FE Yes Yes - -
Firm FE - - Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes - -
Firm-Specific Time Trends - - Yes Yes
Observations 20,412 20,412 20,412 20,412
R-squared 0.019 0.051 0.201 0.447
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at firms level in parentheses with ∗∗∗,
∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
OLS regressions. Constant is not shown. The dependent variable is the total
number of NGO reports at quarter t. Sponsor is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm
is a sponsor to a sport mega event at quarter t. Column 1 and 2 includes sector
fixed effects, quarter fixed effects and sector-specific time trends. Column 3
and 4 includes firm fixed effects, quarter fixed effects and firm-specific time
trends.
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Appendix A: Supplementary Tables
Table ST1: Host Countries of World Cups and Olympic Games, 2002-2010
World Cup Summer Olympic Games Winter Olympic Games
2002: Korea and Japan 2004: Greece 2002: USA
2006: Germany 2008: China 2006: Italy
2010: South Africa 2010: Canada
Note: This table reports the list of sport event host countries.
Table ST2: Participant countries to World Cups, 2002-2010
World Cup 2002 World Cup 2002 World Cup 2006 World Cup 2006 World Cup 2010 World Cup 2010
Argentina Nigeria Argentina Paraguay Algeria Italy
Belgium Paraguay Brazil Poland Argentina Japan
Brazil Poland Costa Rica Portugal Australia Korea, Republic of
Cameroon Portugal Cote d’Ivoire Senegal Brazil Mexico
China Russia Czech Republic Spain Switzerland Nigeria
Costa Rica Senegal Denmark Sweden Chili Netherlands
Croatia South Africa Ecuador Switzerland Cote d’Ivoire New Zealand
Denmark Spain France Togo Cameroon Portugal
Ecuador Sweden Germany Trinidad and Tobago Costa Rica Paraguay
France Tunisia Ghana Tunisia Denmark South Africa
Germany Turkey Iran Ukraine Germany United Kingdom
Ireland United Arab Emirates Italy United Arab Emirates France United States
Italy United Kingdom Japan United Kingdom Spain Uruguay
Japan United States Korea, Republic of United States Ghana
Korea, Republic of Uruguay Mexico Uruguay Greece
Mexico Netherlands Honduras
Note: 32 countries participated to each World Cup. Slovania participated to the World Cup in 2002 and 2010, Serbia Montenegro in
2006 and 2010, North Korea in 2010 but we do not have data on NGO reports for these countries.
Table ST3: Sponsors of World Cups and Olympic Games, 2002-2010
World Cup Winter OG Summer OG World Cup Winter OG Summer OG World Cup Winter OG
2002 2002 2004 2006 2006 2008 2010 2010
Adidas Coca-Cola Adidas Adidas Coca-Cola Adidas Adidas Coca-Cola
Hyundai McDonalds Coca-Cola Continental Fiat BHP Billiton Continental General Electric
MasterCard Panasonic McDonalds Deutsche Telekom General Electric China Mobile Hyundai General Motors
Toshiba Samsung Panasonic Hyundai San Paolo Coca-Cola Kia Panasonic
Yahoo Schlumberger Samsung MasterCard Manulife General Electric McDonalds Ricoah
Coca-Cola Visa Visa Toshiba McDonalds Johnson and Johnson MTN Group Royal Bank of Canada
McDonalds Xerox Xerox Yahoo Panasonic Manulife Sony Samsung
Nike* Nike* Nike* Coca-Cola Samsung McDonalds Coca-Cola Teck Resources
Adidas* McDonalds Telecom Italia Panasonic Visa Visa




Note: The list of firms presented here shows only the sponsor firms that are in the CovalenceEthicalQuote database.
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Table ST4: Level of NGO Report and Hosting - Country Controls
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control Log GDP/cap Log Population Trade Openness Polity 2 ICRG
Host -0.571** -0.582** -0.577** -0.595*** -0.574***
(0.246) (0.250) (0.247) (0.184) (0.168)
Controls -0.047 2.006 0.00338 0.0338 3.544***
(0.50) (1.676) (0.00281) (0.0383) (0.959)
Observations 1,133 1,133 1,133 1,005 987
R-squared 0.202 0.202 0.203 0.209 0.213
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Institutions Civil Economic Political Political Freedom of
Liberties Influences Pressures Rights the Press
Host -0.615*** -0.764*** -0.779*** -0.616*** -0.613***
(0.195) (0.166) (0.171) (0.196) (0.195)
Institutions -0.121** -0.0160 -0.00810 0.0172 -0.00946
(0.0505) (0.0281) (0.0242) (0.0468) (0.00939)
Observations 1,156 907 907 1,156 1,156
R-squared 0.199 0.197 0.197 0.198 0.199
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. OLS regressions for all specifications with country fixed effects
and country-specific time trends. Constant is not shown. Variable Institutions represents alternatively
Civil Liberties (Column 7), Economic Influences over Media Content (Column 8), Laws and Regulations
that Influence Media Content (Column 9), Political Pressures and Controls on Media Content (Column 10),
Political Right (Column 11) and Freedom of the Press (Column 12).
Table ST5: Level of NGO Report and Hosting - Outliers Issue
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3)
All 3SD 2SD
Host -0.444** -0.469** -0.292*
(0.185) (0.187) (0.159)
Observations 1,284 1,273 1,212
R-squared 0.196 0.217 0.294
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses
with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels. OLS regressions. All specifications include country fixed
effect and country-specific time trends. Constant is not shown. The de-
pendent variable is the total number of NGO reports at quarter t. Host is
a dummy equal to 1 if the country hosts a sport mega event at quarter t.
Specification 1 is our preferred specifications. Specification 2 excludes
3 standard deviation outliers (labeled 3SD). Specification 3 excludes 2
standard deviation outliers (labeled 2SD).
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Table ST6: Level of NGO Reports and Hosting a Sport Event - Lag and Forecast
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3)






Observations 1,242 1,263 1,221
R-squared 0.178 0.195 0.178
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in paren-
theses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. OLS regressions. Constant is
not shown. All specifications include country fixed effect and
country-specific time trends. The dependent variable is the total
number of NGO reports at quarter t. Hostt is a dummy equal
to 1 if the country hosts a sport mega event at quarter t.
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Table ST7: Robustness of the Performance Effect
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Independent Variable Model Coefficient SE
Participation Quarter FE -0.0744 (0.0762)
Season FE -0.127* (0.0739)
Country Season FE -0.170* (0.1000)
Common Quarter Trend -0.0862 (0.0725)
1/8Final Quarter FE -0.120 (0.101)
Season FE -0.195* (0.100)
Country Season FE -0.281** (0.138)
Common Quarter Trend -0.161 (0.105)
1/4Final Quarter FE -0.353*** (0.0746)
Season FE -0.412*** (0.0757)
Country Season FE -0.571*** (0.135)
Common Quarter Trend -0.429*** (0.0773)
1/2Final Quarter FE -0.448*** (0.153)
Season FE -0.490*** (0.143)
Country Season FE -0.598** (0.245)
Common Quarter Trend -0.577*** (0.143)
Final Quarter FE -0.563** (0.269)
Season FE -0.648*** (0.185)
Country Season FE -0.988*** (0.228)
Common Quarter Trend -0.716*** (0.233)
V ictory Quarter FE -0.540 (0.403)
Season FE -0.596** (0.268)
Country Season FE -0.966*** (0.347)
Common Quarter Trend -0.678* (0.347)
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses with ∗∗∗,
∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. In
each model, we include country fixed effects. We add alternatively, quarter fixed
effects, season fixed effects, country-specific season fixed effects and common
quarter trend. OLS regressions for all specifications. Constant is not shown.
Participation is coded 1 for countries that participated in World Cup and 0 oth-
erwise. 1/8Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a eight-final of
World Cup. 1/4Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a quarter-final
of World Cup. 1/2Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a semi-final
of World Cup. Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a final of World
Cup.
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Table ST8: Level of NGO Report and World Cup Performance - Country Controls
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explanatory Variables
(Performance) Participation 1/8 Final 1/4 Final 1/2 Final F inal V ictory
Performance -0.269*** -0.391*** -0.466*** -0.643*** -0.655*** -0.739**
(0.0919) (0.0887) (0.0952) (0.140) (0.219) (0.311)
Log GDP/cap 0.977 0.954 0.939 0.949 0.954 0.955
(0.777) (0.782) (0.780) (0.783) (0.783) (0.783)
Log Population 0.731 0.775 0.621 0.549 0.583 0.560
(4.097) (4.112) (4.067) (4.051) (4.050) (4.044)
Openness 0.00231 0.00231 0.00228 0.00219 0.00218 0.00211
(0.00352) (0.00351) (0.00350) (0.00352) (0.00353) (0.00353)
Polity 2 0.0494 0.0546 0.0530 0.0521 0.0532 0.0535
(0.0320) (0.0331) (0.0326) (0.0325) (0.0326) (0.0326)
ICRG 3.191*** 3.230*** 3.255*** 3.203*** 3.281*** 3.330***
(1.083) (1.078) (1.080) (1.086) (1.105) (1.100)
Observations 962 962 962 962 962 962
R-squared 0.214 0.215 0.214 0.216 0.212 0.211
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The explanatory variablePerformance is alternatively the following
variables: Participation is coded 1 for countries that participated in World Cup and 0 otherwise (column 1);
1/8Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a eight-final of World Cup (column 2); 1/4Final is coded
1 for countries that participated to a quarter-final of World Cup (column 3); 1/2Final is coded 1 for countries
that participated to a semi-final of World Cup (column 4); Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a
final of World Cup (column 5); V ictory is coded 1 for countries that won the final of World Cup (column 6).
OLS regressions for all specifications with country fixed effects and country-specific time trends. Constant is not
shown.
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Table ST9: Level of NGO Report and Performance - Institutional Controls
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institutions Civil Economic Laws and Political Political Freedomof
Liberties Influences Regulations Pressures Rights thePress
Participation -0.293*** -0.290*** -0.282*** -0.288*** -0.302*** -0.297***
(0.0866) (0.0903) (0.0923) (0.0914) (0.0853) (0.0861)
Institutions -0.107** -0.0205 -0.0178 -0.00479 0.0195 -0.00864
(0.0521) (0.0279) (0.0258) (0.0243) (0.0473) (0.00957)
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Institutions Civil Economic Laws and Political Political Freedom of
Liberties Influences Regulations Pressures Rights the Press
1/8Final -0.441*** -0.419*** -0.410*** -0.417*** -0.441*** -0.437***
(0.0891) (0.0988) (0.100) (0.0990) (0.0872) (0.0886)
Institutions -0.121** -0.0205 -0.0180 -0.00549 0.0149 -0.00882
(0.0499) (0.0276) (0.0255) (0.0245) (0.0458) (0.00949)
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Institutions Civil Economic Laws and Political Political Freedom of
Liberties Influences Regulations Pressures Rights the Press
1/4Final -0.531*** -0.508*** -0.493*** -0.502*** -0.529*** -0.524***
(0.0992) (0.119) (0.123) (0.120) (0.0975) (0.0990)
Institutions -0.123** -0.0217 -0.0181 -0.00543 0.0170 -0.00884
(0.0502) (0.0274) (0.0254) (0.0244) (0.0467) (0.00940)
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Institutions Civil Economic Laws and Political Political Freedom of
Liberties Influences Regulations Pressures Rights the Press
1/2Final -0.729*** -0.756*** -0.732*** -0.743*** -0.733*** -0.732***
(0.145) (0.190) (0.202) (0.193) (0.143) (0.142)
Institutions -0.118** -0.0239 -0.0181 -0.00615 0.0175 -0.00947
(0.0495) (0.0272) (0.0248) (0.0242) (0.0469) (0.00928)
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
(25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
Institutions Civil Economic Laws and Political Political Freedom of
Liberties Influences Regulations Pressures Rights the Press
Final -0.754*** -0.829*** -0.808*** -0.808*** -0.754*** -0.758***
(0.229) (0.260) (0.257) (0.263) (0.228) (0.220)
Institutions -0.121** -0.0236 -0.0215 -0.00565 0.0157 -0.00992
(0.0506) (0.0275) (0.0260) (0.0242) (0.0460) (0.00940)
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
(31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
Institutions Civil Economic Laws and Political Political Freedom of
Liberties Influences Regulations Pressures Rights the Press
V ictory -0.773** -0.842** -0.811** -0.815** -0.772** -0.778**
(0.350) (0.386) (0.381) (0.389) (0.349) (0.337)
Institutions -0.121** -0.0234 -0.0212 -0.00553 0.0157 -0.00991
(0.0506) (0.0274) (0.0261) (0.0242) (0.0460) (0.00939)
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting signif-
icance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. OLS regressions for all specifications with country fixed effects and country-
specific time trends. Constant is not shown. Variable Institutions represents alternatively Civil Liberties, Economic
Influences over Media Content, Laws and Regulations that Influence Media Content, Political Pressures and Controls
on Media Content, Political Right and Freedom of the Press. Participation is coded 1 for countries that participated
in World Cup and 0 otherwise. 1/8Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a eight-final of World Cup.
1/4Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a quarter-final of World Cup. 1/2Final is coded 1 for countries
that participated to a semi-final of World Cup. Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a final of World Cup.
V ictory is coded 1 for countries that won the final of World Cup.
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Table ST10: Level of NGO Reports and World Cup Performance - Outliers Issue
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







Observations 1,273 1,212 1,273 1,211 1,273 1,213
R-squared 0.214 0.292 0.216 0.291 0.220 0.288
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)





V ictory -0.784* -0.866*
(0.457) (0.522)
Observations 1,273 1,214 1,273 1,213 1,273 1,213
R-squared 0.221 0.292 0.217 0.290 0.216 0.289
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respec-
tively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Participation is coded 1 for countries
that participated in World Cup and 0 otherwise. 1/8Final is coded 1 for countries that partici-
pated to a eight-final of World Cup. 1/4Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a
quarter-final of World Cup. 1/2Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a semi-final of
World Cup. Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a final of World Cup. OLS regres-
sions for all specifications with country fixed effects and country-specific time trends. Constant is
not shown. Specification labeled 3SD excludes 3 standard deviation outliers. Specification labeled
2SD excludes 2 standard deviation outliers.
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Table ST11: Level of NGO Report and World Cup Performance - Lag and Forecast
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explanatory Variables
(Performance) Participation 1/8 Final 1/4 Final 1/2 Final F inal V ictory
Performancet -0.163** -0.254** -0.537*** -0.753*** -0.759** -0.768*
(0.0768) (0.117) (0.0873) (0.167) (0.297) (0.453)
Performancet−1 -0.331*** -0.404*** -0.633*** -0.957*** -1.286*** -1.287***
(0.121) (0.152) (0.182) (0.233) (0.0367) (0.0559)
Performancet+1 0.0443 0.149 0.0876 0.0258 0.0256 -0.548***
(0.0980) (0.105) (0.150) (0.405) (0.405) (0.000)
Observations 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221
R-squared 0.185 0.186 0.192 0.191 0.182 0.181
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The explanatory variablePerformance is alternatively the following
variables: Participation is coded 1 for countries that participated in World Cup and 0 otherwise (column 1);
1/8Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a eight-final of World Cup (column 2); 1/4Final is coded
1 for countries that participated to a quarter-final of World Cup (column 3); 1/2Final is coded 1 for countries
that participated to a semi-final of World Cup (column 4); Final is coded 1 for countries that participated to a
final of World Cup (column 5); V ictory is coded 1 for countries that won the final of World Cup (column 6).
OLS regressions for all specifications with country fixed effects and country-specific time trends. Constant is not
shown.
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Table ST12: Level of NGO Report and Performance - Country Culture
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(V ariables of Interaction) # of World # Clubs TV Too Much Sport Proud of
Cup won on TV your country
Panel A
Participation -0.0779 -0.158* 0.177 -0.0178 -0.322***
(0.0813) (0.0926) (0.194) (0.131) (0.114)
Interaction -0.0799** 2.463 -0.00754 -0.00758* -0.0783***
(0.0352) (3.064) (0.00494) (0.00416) (0.0185)
Observations 1,268 1,268 422 422 422
R-squared 0.194 0.193 0.146 0.143 0.148
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(V ariables of Interaction) # of World # Clubs TV Too Much Sport Proud of
Cup won on TV your country
Panel B
1/8Final -0.159 -0.291* 0.268 -0.0585 -0.300
(0.123) (0.148) (0.183) (0.184) (0.215)
Interaction -0.0833** 2.972 -0.0112* -0.00836 -0.0445
(0.0396) (4.349) (0.00611) (0.00622) (0.0465)
Observations 1,268 1,268 422 422 422
R-squared 0.195 0.194 0.147 0.144 0.144
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. OLS regressions. Constant is not shown. The dependent variable
is the total number of NGO reports measured at the country-quarter level. We interact successively the
dummy Participation with 5 country-specific constant over time measures (column 1 to 5) and the dummy
1/8Final with this same 5 country-specific measures (column 6 to 10). The # of World Cup won measure
the number of FIFA World Cup won by country. The variable # of Clubs is a measure of the number of clubs
of football per capita in each country. Variables TV, Too much sport on TV and Proud of your country come
from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Leisure Time and Sports module for 34 countries
in the 2007. The variable TV come from the answer to the following question: What sport do you watch
on TV most frequently?. TV is the proportion of people who answer “football / soccer” for each country in
2007. The variable Too much sport on TV is computed from the answer, on a scale from 1 to 5 (disagree
strongly), to the following question: People have different opinions about sports. To what extent do you agree
or disagree with the following statements? There is too much sport on TV?. Too much sport on TV represents
the proportion of people who answer “strongly disagree” over the number of respondent for each country.
The variable Proud of your country is computed thanks the answer, on a scale from 1 to 4 (I am not proud at
all), to the following question: How proud are you when [Your Country] does well at an international sports
or games competition?. The variable Proud of your country is the proportion of people who do not answer “I
am not proud at all” over the number of respondent for each country. The highest is the variable the higher is
the proportion of respondent who are proud of their country during an international competition.
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Table ST13: Level of NGO Reports and Sponsorship - Firm Controls
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sponsor 0.185** 0.185** 0.186** 0.0812* 0.0812* 0.0811*
(0.0853) (0.0853) (0.0885) (0.0478) (0.0478) (0.0478)
Sales 0.0522*** -0.00288
(0.0185) (0.00910)




Observations 16,420 16,420 16,420 16,420 16,420 16,420
R-squared 0.089 0.089 0.105 0.470 0.470 0.470
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at firm level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. OLS regressions. Specifications 1 to 3 include sector fixed effects,
quarter fixed effects and sector-specific time trends. Specifications 4 to 6 include firm fixed effects, quarter
fixed effects and firm-specific time trends. Constant is not shown. The dependent variable is the total number
of NGO reports measured at the firm-quarter level. Sponsor is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a sponsor to
a sport mega event at quarter t. Sales, Operating Rev. and Assets are the log of respectively the sales, the
operating revenue and the assets measured at the firm-year level. These variables are provided by Orbis.
Table ST14: Level of NGO Report and Sponsorship - Outliers Issue
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3)
All 3SD 2SD
Sponsor 0.208** 0.150*** 0.105**
(0.0839) (0.0525) (0.0465)
Observations 20,412 19,791 19,339
R-squared 0.049 0.038 0.043
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at firm level in paren-
theses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. OLS regressions. All specifica-
tions include sector fixed effects, quarter fixed effects and sec-
tor specific time trends. Constant is not shown. The dependent
variable is the total number of NGO reports measured at the
firm-quarter level. Sponsor is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm
is a sponsor to a sport mega event at quarter t. Specification 1
is our preferred specifications. Specification 2 excludes 3 stan-
dard deviation outliers (labeled 3SD). Specification 3 excludes
2 standard deviation outliers (labeled 2SD).
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Table ST15: Level of NGO Reports and Sponsorship - Lag and Forecast
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3)






Observations 19,278 19,278 19,278
R-squared 0.047 0.047 0.047
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at firm level in paren-
theses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. OLS regressions. All specifica-
tions include sector fixed effects, quarter fixed effects and sec-
tor specific time trends. Constant is not shown. The dependent
variable is the total number of NGO reports measured at the
firm-quarter level. Sponsor is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is
a sponsor to a sport mega event at quarter t.
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Table ST16: Level of NGO Reports and Candidature to Sport Events
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Candidaturet 0.00261 -0.0216 -0.00648 -0.0321 -0.0271 -0.0279
(0.146) (0.150) (0.146) (0.150) (0.155) (0.158)
Candidaturet−1 -0.0221 -0.0319 -0.0144 -0.0133
(0.157) (0.156) (0.180) (0.185)
Candidaturet+1 0.0511 0.0359 0.0465 0.0464











Observations 1,284 1,242 1,263 1,221 1,086 1,086
R-squared 0.135 0.121 0.122 0.108 0.103 0.103
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and
∗ respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. OLS regressions for
all specifications with country fixed effects and country-specific time trends. Constant
is not shown. The dependent variable is the total number of NGO’s reports at quarter t.
Candidaturet+k is a dummy equal to 1 if the country is a candidate to a sport mega
event at quarter t + k. Choicet is coded 1 if country is choose to organize a sport
big-event; 0 otherwise.
Table ST17: Level of NGO Report and Other Shocks
Dependent Variable: Level of NGO Reports
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
V ariables Rugby World Cup Election Dummy for #Killed during # Affected by
Participation Nat. Disasters Nat. Disasters Nat. Disasters
V ariables -0.1926** -0.0212 -0.0395 -0.00937 -0.00545
(0.0877) (0.0596) (0.0374) (0.00899) (0.00354)
Observations 1,284 1,151 1,151 1,151 1,151
R-squared 0.194 0.193 0.194 0.194 0.194
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively denoting sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. OLS regressions with country fixed effects and country-specific time trend.
Constant is not shown. The dependent variable is the total number of NGO reports at quarter t. In column 1, V ariables
is a dummy equal to 1 if a country is a participant to the World Cup of Rugby. V ariables is a dummy coded 1 if
there is an election (column 2). Columns 3 to 5, we consider natural disasters effect on NGO reports. V ariables is
a dummy equal to 1 if there is a disaster (column 3) and to the number of killed people during the natural disaster
(column 4) and number of affected people during the natural disaster.
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Appendix B: Figures
Host/participant country media coverage
We measure the media coverage of host and participant countries thanks to the newspapers
articles in Factiva.17 More precisely, we analyze the trend of the number of newspaper articles
dealing with host/participant countries the months around a sport event for which they host or
participate to this game. We consider the same period than in our NGO report data: 2002-2010.
It covers 8 events, 9 host countries and 32 participants country to 3 FIFA World Cups. The list of
events and host/participant countries is presented in tables ST1 and ST2. Studying participant
countries, we focus on FIFA World Cups because only a few countries do not participate to the
Olympic Games. Thanks to Factiva, we run monthly searches between 2002 and 2010 to assess
the number of articles associated to host and participant countries.18 Figures 1 and 2 present the
trend in the average number of articles about respectively host and participant countries during
the event and six months before and after. We observe a clear pattern: a boom of around 43 %
(24 %) in the number of news associated with the names of host (participant) countries during
the time of the games, comparing to their media coverage six month before.
However, it does not mean that stories concerning those countries but not sport are complement
of sport news. Figures 3 (Figure 4) shows the trend in the average of the newspaper article
number dealing with sustainable development in one hand, and sustainable development and
host (participant) countries in another hand.19 We find the opposite pattern: the average number
of articles dealing with host (participant) countries and sustainable development decreases of
around 28 % (5%) during the event. In this exercise, we approximate the newsworthiness of the
stories about firm practices located in host and participant countries, selecting keywords related
to this topic.20 However, it already gives arguments in favor of a substitutability between sport
17The Factiva database provides more than 35,000 articles from newspapers of 200 countries in 26 languages.
Factiva is available for subscribers at http://www.dowjones.com/factiva.
18All results presented here are restricted to articles written in English. We run keyword searches for the name
of host and participant countries.
19All results presented here are restricted to articles written in English. We first run searches for the words
“sustainable” or “sustainability” and “environment” or “environmental”. Then we run searches for those keywords
and the name of the host and participant countries (e.g “China and (sustainable or sustainability or environment or
environmental)”).
20We would have to define an exhaustive list of firm practices related keywords to properly assess the impact of
the host and participant country media coverage on the newsworthiness of these issues. However, environmental or
social responsibility overcomes so many dimensions that it gives the establishment of such a list very exhausting.
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news and news related to firm practices in host and participant countries.
Sponsor media coverage
We replicate this content analysis in Factiva collecting the number of newspapers including the
name of the 572 firms of our sample. This way, we measure the media coverage of those firms
in worldwide newspapers and are able to study the change in the trend during sport events. We
then distinguish between firms that are sponsors of the event and other firms for each event.
The list of firms that are sponsors in our sample of firms is given by table ST3 for each sport
event of the 2002-2010 period. Figure 5 presents the trend of the number of newspaper articles
dealing with sponsors and other firms of our sample during each sport event of the period and
four months before and after. We observe that the number of articles concerning firms that are
not sponsors decreases by more than 30% the month of the event, relatively to what is observed
four months before. It means that the media coverage of those firms is crowded out by the
sport event. However, the fall in the number of articles dealing with sponsors is only about
20% during this period, compared to four months before. In other words, the relative media
coverage of sponsors in the media space devoted to firms in general increases of around during
sport events. Arguably, stories about sponsors are complement to sport news: when the number
of news about sport increases, the relative number of news about sponsors in the total sample
of firm-related news also increases. This pattern is in line with the literature on sponsorship
determinants.
Furthermore, it is not the core of our investigation in this paper, because we analyze here the report activity of an
external source of information to the media, NGOs.
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Months around the event
Host Countries Other Countries
Note: This Figure reports the monthly average number of newspaper articles associated to each of the 140 countries in our sample six months
before and after a sport event. Countries are classified as Host countries when they host Olympic Games or a FIFA World Cup or Other
countries when they do not, every year between 2002 and 2010. We then cover 8 events and 9 host countries. The average number of
country-specific newspaper articles are scaled so that the average number of articles six months before an event is equal to 100.
















Months around the event
Participant Countries Other Countries
Note: This Figure reports the monthly average number of newspaper articles associated to each of the 140 countries in our sample six months
before and after a sport event. Countries are classified as Participant countries when they participate to a FIFA World Cup or Other
countries when they do not, every year between 2002 and 2010. We then cover 3 World Cups and 32 participant countries each time. The
average number of country-specific newspaper articles are scaled so that the average number of articles six months before an event is equal to
100.
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Months around the event
Host Countries Other Countries
Note: This Figure reports the monthly average number of newspaper articles associated to each of the 140 countries and “Sustainab*" and
"Environment*" in our sample six months before and after a sport event. Countries are classified as Host countries when they host Olympic
Games or a FIFA World Cup or Other countries when they do not, every year between 2002 and 2010. We then cover 8 events and 9 host
countries. The average number of country-specific newspaper articles are scaled so that the average number of articles six months before an
event is equal to 100.
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Months around the event
Note: This Figure reports the monthly average number of news articles associated to each of the 140 countries and “Sustainab*" and "Environ-
ment*" in our sample six months before and after a sport event. Countries are classified as Participant countries when they participate to a
FIFA World Cup or Other countries when they do not, every year between 2002 and 2010. We then cover 3 World Cups and 32 participant
countries each time. The average number of country-specific newspaper articles are scaled so that the average number of articles six months
before an event is equal to 100.
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Months around the event
Sponsors Other Firms
Note: This Figure reports the monthly average number of newspaper articles associated to each of the 572 firms of our sample four months
before and after a sport event. Firms are classified as Sponsors when they are sponsor to Olympic Games or a FIFA World Cup or Other
firms when they do not, every year between 2002 and 2010. We then cover 8 events. The average number of country-specific newspaper
articles are scaled so that the average number of articles four months before an event is equal to 100.
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Appendix C: Falsification exercises
First, we run 1,000 regressions drawing randomly nine country-quarter pairs, using a uniform
probability of draw.21 We then create a dummy variable equal to one when the pair has been
chosen, and zero otherwise. We use this new dummy instead of the true “sport game host”
variable. We run our benchmark regression (with country and country-specific quarter trends)
with this new Host variable. Figure 6 presents the distribution of the 1,000 coefficients obtained.
We clearly observe that the distribution is centered around zero. Furthermore, we find that the
mean of the coefficients is equal to 0.0028, with a standard deviation of 0.2049.
In a second test, we create a new dummy variable equals to one randomly choosing quarters
but constraining countries to the list of host countries. We then obtain in each case nine obser-
vations with a value of 1, that take the same country code than in the benchmark sample but a
quarter code that is randomly chosen. Figure 7 reports the distribution of the 1,000 coefficients
obtained and show again that the distribution is centered on zero. The mean of the coefficients
is equal to 0.0093 and the standard deviation is 0.2134.
The third test is similar to the second one, but this time we constrain the nine observations
(that take a value of one for the new dummy variable) to be related to the quarters of the events,
and we randomly draw the country that are attached to them. Once again we repeat this exercise
1,000 times and present the distribution of the estimated coefficients in Figure 8. The mean is
also very close to zero (0.0135), even when we take into account the standard deviation (0.1693).
The last test is specified to detect a country-specific seasonal pattern. We constrain the new
dummy to take the value of one for the same country and the same quarter than in the benchmark
case, but we draw randomly the year. In this case, we obtain dummy variables that are shifted
on a year basis compared to the dataset used in the benchmark regression. We also present the
distribution of our 1,000 estimated coefficients (Figure 9). It is also centered on zero, the mean
of the coefficients is equal to 0.0384, with a standard deviation of 0.2083. Thus we reject the
hypothesis that our crowding out result is due to a country-specific seasonal pattern.
Table ST18 sums up the results of this subsection. It also points out that in each case, more
than 80% of the coefficients are no significantly different from zero (with a level of significance
at 10%). Similarly, the share of negative and significant coefficients obtained in each exercise
21We draw 9 country-quarter pairs because in our original sample we have 9 host countries.
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is between 11.50% (in the full randomization case) and 5.20% (in the shift exercise).
Table ST18: Falsification Exercises: Stylized Facts
Mean Std dev. Unsign Negat (*) Negat (**)
Fully random 0.0028 0.2049 82.30% 11.50% 8.50%
Country constr. 0.0093 0.2134 86.20% 7.90% 5.30%
Time constr. 0.0135 0.1693 86.80% 7.20% 4.00%
Shift 0.0384 0.2083 88.70% 5.20% 3.30%
Note: Negat (*) and Negat (**) present the share of results that are negative and significant at respectively 10% and 5%. Stylized facts for
Fully random is for the distribution of coefficients of the Host variable from 1,000 estimations of equation 1, with country fixed effects and
country-specific time trends. Each simulation randomly assigns a new Host dummy, constraining nine observations to take a value of one (and
zero otherwise). This stylized facts is related to Figure 6. Stylized facts for Country constr. is for the distribution of coefficients of the Host
variable from 1,000 estimations of equation 1, with country fixed effects and country-specific time trends. Each simulation randomly assigns a
new Host dummy, constraining nine observations to take a value of one (and zero otherwise). We also constrain host countries to be the same
than in our benchmark case. This stylized facts is related to Figure 7. Stylized facts for Time constr. is for the distribution of coefficients of
the Host variable from 1,000 estimations of equation 1, with country fixed effects and country-specific time trends. Each simulation randomly
assigns a new Host dummy, constraining nine observations to take a value of one (and zero otherwise). We also constrain the quarters to be
the same than in our benchmark case. This stylized facts is related to Figure 8. Stylized facts for Shift is for the distribution of coefficients of
the Host variable from 1,000 estimations of equation 1, with country fixed effects and country-specific time trends. Each simulation randomly
assigns a new Host dummy, constraining the nine events to occur in the same country and at the same quarter than in the benchmark case, but
shifting the year of occurence during the period (2002-2010). This stylized facts is related to Figure 9.











-.8 -.7 -.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
Coefficient of Host
Distribution of coefficients of the Sport variable from 1,000 estimations of equation 1. Each simulation randomly assigns a new Sport
dummy, constraining nine observations to take a value of one (and zero otherwise). The vertical line indicates the estimated coefficient of
Sport in our preferred specification in Table 4 column 5 (with country fixed effects and country-specific quarter trends).
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Coefficient of Host
Distribution of coefficients of the Sport variable from 1,000 estimations of equation 1. Each simulation randomly assigns a new Sport
dummy, constraining nine observations to take a value of one (and zero otherwise). We also constrain host countries to be the same than in our
benchmark case. The vertical line indicates the estimated coefficient of Sport in our preferred specification in Table 4 column 5 (with country
fixed effects and country-specific quarter trends).
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Coefficient of Host
Distribution of coefficients of the Sport variable from 1,000 estimations of equation 1. Each simulation randomly assigns a new Sport
dummy, constraining nine observations to take a value of one (and zero otherwise). We also constrain the quarters to be the same than in our
benchmark case. The vertical line indicates the estimated coefficient of Sport in our preferred specification in Table 4 column 5 (with country
fixed effects and country-specific quarter trends).
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Coefficient of Host
Distribution of coefficients of the Sport variable from 1,000 estimations of equation 1. Each simulation randomly assigns a new Sport
dummy, constraining the nine events to occur in the same country and at the same quarter than in the benchmark case, but shifting the year of
occurence during the period (2002-2010). The vertical line indicates the estimated coefficient of Sport in our preferred specification in Table
4 column 5 (with country fixed effects and country-specific quarter trends).
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